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Abstract 
 
To survive, parties and politicians need a variety of resources to carry out their various functions 
of administration, voter persuasion, and getting out the vote. A key resource is money. Due to its 
ability to be transformed into other resources and its growing importance, political finance—
specifically campaign finance—has generated a spirited debate within and among democracies. 
The existent body of literature on campaign finance describes differences between systems, the 
influence money has on elections and/or governance, and its impact on corruption levels within 
countries. I propose to add to the existent body of literature on campaign finance by addressing a 
different question: how does a country’s political structure, both formal and informal, contribute 
to the formation of its campaign finance regime? This study will focus on campaign finance in a 
portion of the Anglo-Saxon sphere, specifically in the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Canada. All three democracies regulate campaign finance but have taken different approaches. I 
begin with a general comparison of the different campaign finance regimes of each country. 
Several possible explanations for the differences in the regimes are explored next, broadly 
divided into influences of the regulatory framework and influences of boundary setting. 
Influences of the regulatory framework include the type and number of offices being elected and 
the driving force behind a campaign. Influences of boundary setting are the length of the election 
season, the size of the electoral district, and the ratio of public and private funds being used. 
Finally, I examine the implications that these current regimes have on systemic corruption and 
changes in the democratic deficit within each of the countries. This project suggests that the 
campaign finance regime operating within a country is a function of the limits in place, primarily 
determined by that country’s political structure.  
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Introduction 
Political parties need to generate and capture resources to carry out such functions as 
administrative tasks, persuading voters, and getting out the vote to survive. These resources can 
be placed into five broad categories: administrative tools, established networks, labor, media, and 
money. Over time and space the role and importance of these five ‘types’ of resources have 
changed. Administrative tools simply refer to the physical things a party needs to have and use to 
operate. Falling into this category are such items as organization space, office supplies, storage, 
etc. The second, an established network, is used by parties to raise money and garner volunteers. 
President Barack Obama’s 2012 presidential campaign capitalized on this resource by 
constructing elaborate ‘neighborhood teams,’ where hired field organizations tapped into the 
family connections and friendship networks of its volunteers to increase and maintain support. 
Established networks provide one way to garner people for the third category: labor. Labor 
consists of the campaign workers who volunteer or are paid to work for parties and/or 
candidates; these are the people, or resource, who execute the “ground game” either by 
canvasing neighborhoods, contacting voters, or stuffing letters. The importance of labor, its 
source (unions, government patronage employees, ideologues, etc.), and use has changed over 
time and varies among countries. Fourthly, every party and candidate utilizes the media 
(television, newspapers, radio, the internet, and mailings) to directly contact voters and 
constituents. With the advent of modern technologies, such as television, computers, and the 
internet, parties have an increased ability to directly reach constituents and voters. However, 
advertisements, specifically television advertisements, have significantly increased in price over 
time. Many countries, including the United Kingdom and Canada, have defrayed the rising cost 
of media by either subsidizing or providing air time for candidates and parties (La Raja 2008: 1-
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16; Pinto-Duschinsky 1981: 1-13; Kommers 2006). Lastly, parties need and use money; it is the 
liquid resource that can be easily transformed into what’s needed. Because of its flexibility and 
growing importance, political finance has come under greater scrutiny and regulation over time.  
Politicians, the media, academics from various fields, and the general citizenry have 
debated how parties, and candidates, should finance their activities.  Proposals and implemented 
policy have ranged from fully privatized election systems to fully publicly funded elections.  In 
the 2003 report written by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(International IDEA) on political funding throughout the world, researchers asserted that neither 
a fully privatized nor fully publicly funded electoral system would work well. They concluded 
that a balance between the two must be struck (Austin, Reginald, and Tjernstrom 2003).  
Privatized campaign finance systems are funded not by the government but by private 
citizens and the private sector more generally. Political campaigns can be considered completely 
privatized in two ways. First, parties, candidates, or interest groups organize and run the 
elections from providing the ballots that will be “put in” the ballot box to running the campaigns. 
Managing, or not managing, elections in this manner was eliminated in most Western 
democracies in the first half of the nineteenth century when governments drew many of the 
administrative election tasks under the purview of the state. The United States lagged behind 
other Western democracies and did not do such until the 1890s with the introduction of the secret 
ballot (Hershey 2013).  The second and more applicable method of private funding in most 
Western democracies today is that campaign finance and administrative tasks are driven by 
private donors and parties.  The second funding structure is public funding. Full public funding 
for elections means the full funding of campaigns and electoral administration by the 
government. Public funding can come in many forms ranging from subsidies to matching funds. 
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All countries fall somewhere in between the two extremes. Of the three countries to be 
examined in this study, the United States lies closest to the private financing end of the spectrum. 
However, presidential candidates can still choose to take public funding to finance their 
campaigns and many states subsidize local party activities. The United Kingdom lies closest to a 
publicly funded system, because it currently provides broader sources of public subsidization and 
resources than either Canada or the United States. However, the government merely subsidizes 
campaigns and parties; it does not fully fund them. Canada falls between the two. 
Mirroring the general discussion of public versus private financing of political campaigns 
is the discussion of the reasons for or against the different methods. Primary in this debate is the 
discussion that looks at free speech concerns versus regulations to prevent corruption. The basic 
free speech argument asserts that by regulating and limiting the flow of money in elections the 
government infringes upon a citizen’s right to free speech. This argument is grounded in the 
belief that money is a form of speech, as has been colloquially stated in the United States since 
Buckley v Valeo (1976). The United States is unique because its constitution explicitly includes 
the protection of free speech without a provision on when it can be infringed upon; the US 
Supreme Court has ruled that many limits and regulations of campaign finance infringe upon free 
speech. Most judicial systems in other countries either do not have as much power as the US 
Supreme Court or choose to not interfere to the same extent as the US courts on matters of 
campaign finance. Opposite in this debate are arguments for regulations, which are seen by their 
opponents as being “anti-free speech” in discussions of campaign finance. Proponents of 
regulations assert that they are anti-corruption, not anti-free speech; they believe that an 
unregulated system leads to corruption (Buckley v Valeo 1976; Citizens United v FEC 2010; 
Harper v Canada (Attorney General) 2004).  
P a g e  | 6 
 
Debates centering on corruption associated with campaign finance generate another 
focused debate: what corruption provides justification for regulations? Loosely defined, electoral 
corruption damages or endangers the integrity of the electoral process and potentially corrupts 
the governing apparatus. This should be prevented in a democratic country because it in turn 
allows citizens, and other countries, to question the legitimacy of their governments. Damages to 
the electoral process can be either real or perceived and occur at the individual or institutional 
levels. This means that campaign finance laws, when written for the purpose of curbing 
corruption, are designed to prevent different types of corruption. Additionally, for researchers 
this means that measures of success and need for reform should vary depending on what kind of 
corruption is being discussed and targeted (Genovese and Myers 2010: 37-64: Drew 1999; 
Harper v Canada (Attorney General) 2004; Ansolabehere 2007).  
These discussions revolve around dissecting various aspects of existent campaign finance 
regimes. Such a discussion would be made richer if the influences acting on the formation of the 
current regimes were also discussed. A campaign finance regime is the legal framework 
governing the contributions and expenditures made in an election cycle, the disclosure of both, 
and the governing body overseeing the election or financial aspect. In order to better understand 
these discussions, the factors shaping current regimes should be better understood. To identify 
the potential influences and implications of campaign finance regimes, the current regimes in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada will be compared. 
The Existent Literature 
Within the existent campaign finance literature there are three main questions that are 
addressed in two distinct ways: comparative between systems and examining one specific 
system.  
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First, researchers ask, “how and why do systems of political finance vary between or 
within countries?” Articles and books answering this question look at snapshots of political 
climates and regulations either internationally, intra-nationally, or across different time periods 
in the same country. International studies typically compare nations within a single region and 
highlight idiosyncrasies within structurally similar systems such as continental Western Europe. 
Another common approach is to group countries by region and compare regions while noting 
internal regional variation. An example of this approach would be a comparison between 
Western Europe and Latin America. One study that does both is the 2003 report published by the 
International IDEA. The report groups countries by region, such as continental Western Europe, 
Africa, the Anglo-Saxon Orbit, etc., and teases out the differences among countries within those 
groupings. This study looked at nationwide or federal funding for nationwide or federal 
elections. Similar methods have been applied to the study of the variations among states or other 
sub-national units in the same country. There is a popular literature that does just this among the 
US states (Ansolabehere 2007; Hamm and Hogan 2007). This strain may slowly become 
obsolete depending on the impact of the US Supreme Court’s recent ruling that struck down 
specific campaign finance regulations in Montana and Arizona. According to Susan E. Scarrow 
in her article reviewing the existent body of campaign finance literature, generalizations made 
across countries and an agreed upon terminology are missing from this body of literature (2007).   
Second, others broadly ask, “how does political spending influence elections and/or 
governance?”  The literature addressing this question divides into three bodies.  One examines 
how and if spending impacts an election.  For example, in American politics this strain has 
resulted in the conclusion that to win against an incumbent the challenger needs to outspend the 
incumbent. An addition to this, however, claims that above a certain threshold more money does 
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not increase the likelihood of a candidate winning (Jacobson 2009: 65-83).  Another examines 
how spending and contributions to campaigns and political parties impact governance once 
politicians gain office.  Included within this strain of work are studies looking at how different 
groups react and adapt to various landmark reforms to the political financial system.  In Robert 
Boatright’s book Interest Groups and Campaign Finance Reform in the United States and 
Canada, Boatright examines how the labor unions, corporations, and various interest groups 
such as the Sierra Club adapt to and/or fight changes to the campaign finance structure (2011).  
Raymond La Raja’s book Small Change also studied this but focused on how parties utilize 
regulations as a tool to gain dominance over the other party and how factions gain dominance 
over other factions within their own party (2008). The third strain looks at how finance and 
spending affect public confidence in the government as a whole, its branches, and public 
officials.  Concerns over the influence of money in politics have led courts in most nations to 
allow campaign finance regulations to stand without much interference (Kommers 2006; BeVier 
1985; Issacharoff 2009).  The US Supreme Court appears to be an anomaly in restricting 
legislative efforts to regulate because it has been extremely active in the realm of campaign 
finance. It balances assiduously protecting freedom of speech with the recognition that there 
could be justification for restricting it if it leads to the reality or perception that money is 
corrupting the democratic process (Buckley v. Valeo 1976). 
Within this broad question is another: “how do public subsidies impact the political 
system, including parties, individual politicians, and interest groups?”  Similar to the larger 
umbrella question it can be studied at varying levels ranging from between different areas within 
a single country to countries grouped into regions or like-country groups.  However, this sub-
question often narrows to a specific portion of political finance and its impacts.  The impact can 
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be judged by who becomes insulated from different influences, from what they become 
insulated, and/or effects on party development.  Many of these studies have looked towards 
European countries as the archetypes of publicly subsidized systems (Scarrow 2007; Boatright 
2011).  Increasingly, the United States can only serve as a model of what happens when there is 
no public option due to recent trends in presidential campaigns to steer away from public funding 
and the slow but constant striking down of public finance laws in individual states.   
Third is the question of “what is the level of corruption in a country, as it relates to 
campaign and political finance” otherwise known as a sector of corruption studies.  There are 
two general ‘types’ of corruption that are linked to campaign finance: individual-level, or micro, 
corruption and systemic, or macro, corruption.  The standard definition of individual-level 
corruption is localized bribery, intimidation, or fraud.  In Western Europe and the United States, 
laws to eliminate this type of corruption began in the late seventeenth century, but they look 
markedly different from today’s laws.  Corruption law, and specifically campaign finance law, as 
it is known today began in the 1880s in the United Kingdom and the United States.  Since the 
inauguration of these laws, many have concluded that this form of corruption has become 
exceedingly rare.  On the other hand, some are still concerned about the persistence and 
perception of the existing systemic corruption (Ansolabehere 2007; Stefes 2007). Systemic 
corruption is defined as the permeation of localized corruption in a system or through the 
systemized blockage of political equality.  Ralph P. Hummel specifically describes how systemic 
corruption can be identified in the second case as the insistence by the citizenry that “public 
servants serve their ends with means not only contradictory to those ends but designed to create 
structures and conditions under which the moral status, psychological integrity, and values 
system of the citizen are undermined…” (1986, 2) Studies that look at systemic corruption assert 
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that systemic corruption in the West is equivalent to rent seeking behaviors seen in other 
countries such as Russia in the 1990s. A sign that this may be occurring is that campaign 
contributions and expenditures increase faster than the national economy (Ansolabehere 2007; 
Stefes 2007). 
The Layout of this Study  
I propose to add to the existent body of literature on campaign finance by asking a 
different question: how does a country’s political structure, both formal and informal, contribute 
to the formation of its campaign finance regime? This study will focus on the state of campaign 
finance in a portion of the Anglo-Saxon sphere, specifically in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Canada. First, the general similarities and differences between the electoral rules 
will be discussed in order to establish that the electoral mechanisms are generally the same and 
that the differences may help explain variation in campaign finance regimes. Second, the 
(remaining) different structural aspects of the countries’ electoral systems will be compared to 
identify what may influence the formation of different campaign finance regimes. The structural 
differences are divided into two categories: influences on the overall framework and the 
influences on where either contribution or expenditure limits are set. Finally, I look at 
implications of the current regimes in terms of systemic corruption and changes in the 
democratic deficit.  
The Subjects of This Study 
To determine the influences of varying campaign finance structures, the “most similar 
systems” approach, outlined by Przerzeworski and Tenue, is taken. This approach entails holding 
the greatest number of variables constant so that the number of experimental variables, those 
being looked at to explain a certain behavior or regime, is minimized. The theory behind this 
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method is that the variables “held constant” do not determine the behavior or regime being 
examined, and that the differing variables will explain the varying behaviors or regimes. One 
typical set of countries examined when using this approach are the Anglo-Saxon countries 
(Przeworski and Tenue 1970: 31-46). I do just that in this study. I hold the basic electoral system, 
legal tradition, and culture constant by comparing a portion of the Anglo-Saxon sphere while 
looking at the remaining variables to explain variation in their campaign finance regimes.  
In this study, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada are compared while 
Australia and New Zealand are excluded. The US, UK, and Canada belong to the Anglo-Saxon 
sphere, which is categorized by its shared legal tradition—the common law tradition—and 
cultural history (Boatright 2011: 1-21).
1
 New Zealand and Australia are also a part of the Anglo-
Saxon sphere but have been excluded from this study because they have different electoral 
systems than the included countries. New Zealand has a mixed electoral system.
2
Australia uses 
the alternative vote
3
 and maintains mandatory voting laws. 
4
 The three countries in this study use 
neither a mixed electoral system nor the alternative vote but rather a plurality/majoritarian 
system for national elections. Additionally, none of the included countries maintain mandatory 
voting laws at the national level. One last important similarity between the three countries is that 
all are two party systems.  
                                                          
1
 Cultural or institutional differences between the three countries could account for variations on the particulars of 
each electoral system such as specific regulations, the role of campaign finance in an election, and the method of 
campaigning in each country.  For this study, the basic, but potentially challengeable, assumption that all 3 cultures 
are functionally similar or the same is taken.  This position can be defended on two fronts.  First, some political 
scientists point to the common heritage of Canada and the United States as British colonies from which both 
inherited—to some extent—their institutions and cultural identities (Lipset 1988). .  Second, there has not been a 
study comparing the difference in the philosophical bases of campaign finance in practice and regulations.  As a 
result, for the time being culture can and will be held as a constant (Boatright 2011).  
2
 For more information on New Zealand’s electoral system, visit http://www.elections.org.nz/.  
3
 The alternative vote asks voters to rank candidates in order of preference.  If a single candidate does not garner a 
majority of the vote then the marked second option of all those who voted for the least vote getter are counted.  This 
continues until a single individual has a majority.  This system still results in a de facto two party system, but the 
process is substantially different than that in the US, the UK, and Canada. 
4
 For More information on Australia’s electoral system, visit http://www.aec.gov.au/. 
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From this brief overview it can be seen that all three countries share basic electoral 
similarities. However, there are differences that must be accounted for to better understand the 
underlying factors of their campaign finance regimes such as the shape of their respective 
electoral seasons and generation of legal changes to their regimes. To justify comparing these 
three countries and understand their respective campaign finance structures, their electoral 
systems and their campaign finance regulations must be described in detail.  
The United States
5
 
As the lone presidential system in the Anglo-Saxon sphere, the United States developed 
different democratic institutions than the UK or Canada, despite their shared common law 
tradition and culture.  The US citizenry elects both the national legislature (Congress) and the 
executive (the president), whereas only one legislative house is directly elected in either 
parliamentary system. Additionally, of the three countries only Canada and the US have active 
national courts and formal constitutions. While all three countries hold subnational elections, 
they are so different that only the national government and elections will be compared. 
Electoral System No matter the measure, the US has the longest election season and 
higher levels of campaign contributions and expenditures than other Anglo-Saxon countries.  
Additionally, there are more offices that an individual may vote on and run for at the national 
level.
6
 In the US, the different types of national offices are the president, 435 Representatives, 
and 100 Senators. The entirety of the House of Representatives, standardly the officials with the 
smallest districts of the three offices, is elected or re-elected every two years; they are subject to 
the “permanent campaign,” meaning representatives, not simply the parties, in office and 
                                                          
5
 For more information on the US system, current laws, court cases, and campaign finance information, visit fec.gov, 
opensecrets.org, supremecourtus.gov, house.gov, senate.gov.  
6
 In a given election every US citizen votes on two or three federal candidates depending on whether it is a 
presidential election year and if one of that citizen’s senatorial seats was up for election. 
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challengers begin campaigning immediately after the previous election has concluded.  Senators 
serve six year terms, but a third of the senate is elected or reelected every two years.  Due to their 
longer term in office, a senator may not be forced to wage a “permanent campaign,” but this 
varies from state to state depending on the competitiveness of the state and the individual races. 
The most prominent national election is the presidential election.  A president can serve up to 
two four year terms and is popularly elected by the nation as a whole through the Electoral 
College, with each state’s electors almost always voting for the state-wide winner.  However, the 
public is mostly unaware of the permanent campaign and instead sees the election season as 
starting the winter immediately before the November general election with the primaries. These 
are held at different times depending on when each state’s legislature or Secretary of State’s 
office sets the date for the primary; this is unlike the general election for congressional, 
senatorial, and presidential elections, which are nationally mandated to be held on the first 
Tuesday after the first Monday in November.   
As determined by the constitutional requirements for each office, elections for each 
respective office are held every 2, 4, or 6 years.  This is the only way a “mass” or general 
election may be held --meaning US elections are held on a timetable that can be easily 
anticipated allowing parties, politicians, and candidates to emphasize campaigning rather than 
party building.  For each of the offices the election goes through two phases. First, candidates 
must be chosen, usually through a primary, where party candidates compete for their party’s 
nomination. Second, nominees from their respective parties compete.  The candidate with the 
most votes wins. Although party identification plays a significant role in general elections, 
campaigns are candidate focused meaning candidates rather than parties raise the bulk of any 
money donated to their campaigns and that they run their own campaigns. The two parties that 
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standardly field candidates are the Democratic Party, or center-left party, and the Republican 
Party, or the center-right party. Additionally the Federal Election Commission, the FEC, 
oversees campaign finance, and individual states’ Secretary of State’s offices and local election 
boards operating under its supervision administer the elections. 
During an election, candidates spend money on advertisements, mobilization efforts, 
mailings, and paid staffers who manage daily campaign functions. Each of the three types of 
national campaigns generate different levels of spending levels and thus fundraising needs. Of 
the three types of campaigns, US House candidates standardly raise and spend the least amount 
of money of any of the offices, US Senate candidates raise and spend more, but presidential 
candidates raise and spend the most. Here it should be noted that each election impacts the levels 
of spending of the others. For example, in a presidential election year less money will be spent in 
Congressional races than in a non-presidential year. This means that there are two different 
election types—midterm and presidential. Comparisons of the aggregated total spending should 
be made between different elections of the same type.  
Campaign Finance Regulations Of the three countries in this study, US candidates, 
parties, and outside organizations spend the most and are least regulated in their actions. To 
understand the US’ regime, three categories of information must be considered. These are: the 
process of making and implementing laws and regulations, what the landmark pieces of 
legislation are, and how the courts have interpreted those laws. 
The Process Changes to the campaign finance regime can occur in one of three ways. 
First, Congress can write and pass new legislation introducing, changing, or removing 
regulations. Typically, Congress has only exercised this right--in the field of campaign finance--
if the Senators and Representatives believe there has been a violation of ethical conduct or the 
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cost of running has been viewed as exclusionary. The violations could range from trading 
political favors such as ensuring a law is passed for money to bribing voters to the appearance of 
corruption of the process. For example, in the 1970s Watergate and associated Nixon scandals, 
such as the trade of a federal milk subsidy for a pledged $2 million dollar donation from the 
Associated Milk Producers Incorporated and the protection of ITT, spurred legislators and the 
courts to amend and expand the 1971 Federal Campaign Elections Act (Sobel 1974). However, 
senators and congressmen and women elected under the current system are reluctant to diminish 
their advantages in the next election by changing the rules. Second, the Federal Elections 
Commission, FEC, can amend the existing set of regulations within their purview through 
changes in bureaucratic processes; day to day regulation changes and enforcement are left to the 
FEC.
7
 Third, the Supreme Court, or one of the lower courts, may declare portions of the existent 
body of legislation unconstitutional and thus invalid.   
Landmark Legislation Since 1883 with the passage of the Civil Service Act also known 
as the Pendleton Act, campaign finance has been regulated to some degree. The inauguration of 
the modern national campaign finance regime came with the passage of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act, or FECA, in 1971 and subsequent amendments throughout the 1970s. FECA 
implemented caps on individual contributions, codified the use of political action committees 
(PACs), established the FEC, and set up a public funding option for presidential candidates. 
Also, this law and amendments introduced strict disclosure requirements for contributions over 
$200 to PACs and campaigns. For those contributions, PACs and campaigns are obligated to 
report the full name, address, and occupation of the donor and the amount donated.
8
 
                                                          
7
 Candidate campaigns, political action committees, and joint fundraising committees all have to register with the 
FEC.  Super PACs register with and disclose their activities to the IRS. 
8
 There are ways to obfuscate this either by donating to an organization whose activities do not fall under the 
purview of the FEC or by a single individual “bundling” contributions from many donors.  
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Additionally, it attempted to limit the amount a campaign could spend in an election cycle and 
provided for publicly subsidization of US presidential campaign.
9
 More recently, the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act, or BCRA, was passed in 2002. BCRA outlawed soft money 
contributions and contribution limits were raised and indexed against inflation. Both of these 
laws have been challenged in the courts primarily on the basis that they violate the 
constitutionally guaranteed right to free speech.   
Impact of the Courts The courts, specifically the Supreme Court, have taken an active 
role in regulating and revising campaign finance laws and regulations in the US.  In the 1976 
case of Buckley v Valeo, the Supreme Court established the precedent that money is tantamount 
to speech in an election and declared attempts to provide equal opportunity for people running in 
elections to be an invalid justification to pass a campaign finance law.  Instead the only legal 
reason to infringe on free speech during an election is the threat or perception of corruption. In 
the 1970s no one could say anything less than this in light of the Watergate and associated other 
scandals.  More recently the Supreme Court declared restrictions placed on corporations and 
unions since 1907 and 1948, respectively, unconstitutional in the 2010 case of Citizens United v 
FEC.  The court once again cited arguments of infringement of free speech as the reason for the 
majority decision; the dissenting judges disputed this.  The combination of these decisions, other 
decisions, and the treatment of current active laws and regulations has resulted in a campaign 
finance system that resembles the “Wild West.” Only two major restrictions remain. First, a 
candidate or party cannot openly trade money for favors. Second, contribution limits remain for 
donations to candidates and parties, but not to independent groups and PACs.  
                                                          
9
 Historically many states have offered public funding and/or subsidies for state and local campaigns.  However in 
2011 the Supreme Court handed down a decision that declared public funding as currently set up at the state level 
violates the first amendment.  It violates the first amendments, right to freedom of speech, because many states 
prohibit private contributions and spending to or for a campaign that has accepted public funding.   
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The United Kingdom
10
  
Unlike the US, the United Kingdom maintains a unitary parliamentary system.  The UK 
is still essentially a single country with one major level of government under the control of the 
                                                          
10
 For information on the UK system, visit http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/ and http://www.parliament.uk/.  
Table 1: Relevant US Legislation & Rulings 
Bill or Case Language Ramifications 
Federal Elections Campaign 
Act and Amendments 
(1971, 1974, 1976,1979) 
 enacted contribution limits 
 attempted to enact 
expenditure limits 
 increased disclosure 
requirements 
 established the FEC 
 established public funding 
for presidential elections 
 codified and regulated PACs 
(originally corporate and 
union PACs) 
 codified the use of soft 
money 
Established the modern campaign 
finance regime by implementing 
contribution limits and beginning to 
bring the various types of funding 
options under the purview of the 
government (FEC) 
Buckley v Valeo (1976) 
 declared expenditure limits 
unconstitutional  
 established perceived or 
observed corruption as 
reason to encroach upon 
freedom of speech  
Established a precedent of what can 
and cannot be considered reason to 
infringe upon freedom of speech and 
what types of limits are 
constitutional 
Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2003 
 outlawed soft money 
 raised contribution limits and 
pegged them to inflation 
rates 
 limitations placed on issue 
ads run by outside 
organizations that directly 
refer to candidates for federal 
elections 
“Eliminated” soft money and spurred 
the growth of different funding 
avenues for campaigns (i.e. bundling 
and 527s) 
Citizen's United v Federal 
Elections Commission 
(2010) 
 upheld the Buckley v Valeo 
ruling that money is speech 
 eliminated remaining limits 
on corporate and union 
political broadcasting 
Spurred the growth of SuperPACs 
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Prime Minister and his or her government despite a devolution of some powers, such as control 
over the National Health Service, and agencies to the individual regions, such as Scotland.  
Electoral System The UK House of Commons is popularly elected, while its upper 
House, the House of Lords, is appointed by the Queen and the advice of the Prime Minister. 
There are 650 districts in the UK that each elect one MP; they are elected simultaneously.  As of 
2011, with the Fixed Term Parliament Act, a parliamentary election must be held at least every 
five years, but can also be called sooner for one of two reasons.  First, if a motion of no 
confidence is passed by a majority vote in the House of Commons and a new government is not 
formed within two weeks, then an election must be held.  Second, a motion for a general election 
can be passed by the House of Commons by a two thirds supermajority.  Before 2011, there was 
a third method for calling elections; the Queen could dissolve parliament at the behest of the 
Prime Minister and call for a new election.  In any of these occurrences, parliament is dissolved 
but the government (i.e., the executive branch) stays in power until a new government is formed 
after elections to the new parliament.  
The campaigning season lasts for four weeks during which parties, rather than candidates, 
run the campaigns.  The government subsidizes media expenditures by providing free television 
and radio time for political advertisements; campaigns are not allowed to buy additional 
television or radio air time. Parties rather than candidates spend funds on voter mobilization, paid 
staffers, and party rallies.  Because the election season is only four weeks and the most expensive 
forms of advertising are paid for by the state, private party expenditures are significantly lower 
than in the United States.  Additionally, the government keeps a roll of all eligible voters. At the 
polls, citizens vote for one person out of the list of candidates, and whichever candidate earns a 
plurality of the vote wins the seat. 
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At the national level, two parties dominate politics in the UK.  These are the Labour party 
which rose to prominence in the 1920s and 1930s, and the Conservative party which has been an 
actor on the national stage for over a century.  Additionally, the Liberal Democrats are a 
significant third party, but had little to no power either as an opposition party or in government 
until the most recent UK elections forced a coalition to be formed to garner a majority in the 
House of Commons.  However, the Liberal Democrats as they are today still receive a very small 
percentage of seats in Parliament. While this may seem to be in violation of Duverger’s law, 
which says that in a first-past-the-post system there will be only two major parties competing 
against one another, it is not. There are typically never more than two parties seriously 
competing against each other in any given individual election in a district (Riker 1982). For 
example in Manchester the Labour party and the Liberal party face off.   
During an election parties spend the majority of their money on rallies, get out the vote 
efforts, and if needed additional mailings. The party is the main “mover and shaker” in 
organizing campaign efforts. This is in part because the dominance of the party and control of 
the government rests on how the party not the individual fares in the election; if the party loses 
power then an individual MP’s power to actually impact the formation of laws and policy is 
virtually eliminated. Other expenses are paid for by the government or are actions done by the 
government such as registering voters and renting/providing meeting space (Austin, Reginald, 
and Tjernstrom 2003).
11
   
Campaign Finance Regulations For a century, British campaign finance was regulated 
by the British Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883.  Then in 1983 the Representation of the 
People Act was passed, and the People, Parties, Elections and Referendums Act was passed in 
2000.  These three laws shape current campaign finance regulations in the UK.  There are four 
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broad categories regulated in the laws: contributions, expenditures, public fundraising, and 
outside spending.  Each distinguishes between party and candidate funding.  Additionally, parties 
are required to report expenditures and the state of their finances every quarter regardless of 
whether an election has occurred within that quarter.  However, only the identities of individuals 
donating £50 ($79) to a candidate campaign, £5000 ($7898) to the main party, or £1000 ($1580) 
to the local branch of a party must be disclosed.
12
 
There is no legal cap to individual donations.  However, only “permissible persons” may 
donate more than £50 ($79) to candidate campaigns or £200 ($316) to a party.  In the Political 
Parties, Elections, and Referendum Act of 2000, permissible persons are defined as “an 
individual registered in a UK electoral register (including bequests), a UK registered 
company…a GB registered political party, a UK registered trade union, a UK registered building 
society, a UK registered limited liability partnership that carries on business in the UK, a UK 
registered friendly society, [and] a UK based unincorporated association that carries on business 
or other activities in the UK.” This leaves out unregistered groups (ex. foreign companies).  
Although contributions are unlimited, campaign and election expenditures are capped. 
Legally there are two distinct periods in the election cycle where campaign finance for 
candidates is regulated. The first is the long campaign which starts 55 months (approximately 4.5 
years) after a new Parliament sits for the first time and lasts until Parliament is dissolved for an 
election. This limit does not go into effect if an election is called before those 55 months have 
passed. However, short campaign limits, the second period, are always regulated and the 
campaign lasts four weeks. The short campaign lasts from the time Parliament is dissolved until 
the election. The spending limit is higher for the long campaign than the short campaign. 
Candidates are permitted to spend a maximum of a set amount of money in an election; the 
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baseline figure for this is £7150($11,847). Parties are permitted to spend a set amount per 
contested race; in 2010 this figure was £30,000 ($47,490) per contested race. The total amount a 
party can spend is either the sum of the contested rate limit multiplied by the number of 
contested races or £810,000 ($1,279,526). Either way, the party is given more financial power 
than the individual candidate in his or her own race. Outside groups are also allowed to 
campaign during the election.  These groups must register with the government and are subject to 
spending limits.   
Table 2: Relevant UK Legislation 
Bill Language Ramifications 
Representation of the 
People Act 1983 
 Established expenditure limits for 
the campaign and candidate 
personal expenses 
 Established disclosure 
requirements 
 Established advertising subsidies 
for parties and candidates 
 Established the use of specified 
public spaces for election 
meetings 
 Defined corruption 
Established the modern campaign 
finance regime in the UK by 
introducing expenditure limits, 
public subsidies, and disclosure 
requirements 
Political Parties, Elections, 
and Referendums Act 
2000 
 Established expenditure limits for 
parties 
 Differentiates between different 
donors and places restrictions 
based on category 
 Increased disclosure requirements 
with respect to the statements of 
accounts, campaign expenditures, 
and registration 
Increased the amount legally 
allowed to be spent in an election 
cycle and strengthened pre-
existing law in light of the 
Formula One Affair 
Electoral Administration 
Act of 2006 
 Extended regulations of the 2000 
law to include loans and other 
borrowings by candidates and 
parties 
Updated pre-existing law 
Political Parties and 
Elections Act of 2009 
 Increased the threshold for 
disclosure of contributions 
 Set new candidate expenditure 
limits 
Reversed some transparency 
measures taken in previous laws 
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Additionally, public funding is available in three forms.  First, the government provides 
broadcasting time for campaigns and parties during the official election.  Second, the 
government pays for one mailing for each candidate running in an election.  Third, the 
government makes available public space for candidates and parties to hold meetings during the 
election. 
In the UK the only groups of people who have hitherto had a significant impact on 
campaign finance regulation are the Prime Minister and his cabinet, who generally draft such 
legislation, and the majority party in the House of Commons which has the votes to enact the 
legislation.  Yearly limits are set by the Electoral Commission which is an independent 
government agency whose responsibility it is to oversee and administer elections.  
Canada
13
 
Canada’s governmental system is an adapted form of the British Westminster style 
democracy.  In Canada, a greater number of powers are devolved to individual provinces and the 
courts have more power than in the UK.  However, like the UK, Canada does not popularly elect 
an executive.  Rather the role of the executive is filled by the Prime Minister and his associated 
government who is elected by a majority in the House of Commons.  Additionally, there is a 
ceremonial head of state who is appointed by the Queen, or the reigning monarch, of England 
titled the Governor General.  The Governor General acts as a substitute for the Queen, but has no 
significant governing powers.  Additionally, the upper house, the Senate, is appointed rather than 
elected.     
Electoral Systems At the national level, only MPs in the House of Commons are 
popularly elected. Like the UK, the Prime Minister is elected by and from the House of 
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Commons and the Senate is comprised of individuals appointed by the Governor General, the 
Queen of England’s representative in Canada, on the advice of the Prime Minister. Canada is 
divided into 308 districts or ridings; one MP represents each riding. Elections must be held a 
minimum of once every five years but can be held much more frequently if the Governor 
General dissolves parliament at the request of the Prime Minister or a vote of no confidence 
passes in the House of Commons with a supermajority vote.   
The election season must last a minimum of 36 days and no maximum length is set but 
historically it has lasted an average of 51 days but only an average of 44 days in the past 10 
years.
14
 To administer and monitor these elections Canada has created an independent 
organization called Elections Canada, which sets up polling locations, monitors campaign 
finance, sets limits on expenditures, and sets the date of the next election.  Elections Canada 
registers voters and administers government public subsidies for elections.  The government 
subsidizes up to 60% of any candidate’s expenses who garners 10% or more of the vote in a 
riding, up to 50% of any registered party’s expenses who garners 2% or more of the vote in a 
riding, and 6.5 hours of paid advertising or broadcasting time during the last four weeks of the 
election for all registered party candidates.  The government reimburses the parties and 
candidates upon the completion of the election. After the period of campaigning, citizens cast 
their vote for one candidate in each riding; the winner of the plurality of the vote wins the seat. 
At the national level two parties dominate politics.  Since 2011 they have been the 
Conservatives and the New Democratic Party.  The New Democratic Party unseated the Liberal 
Party of Canada as the most powerful left-leaning party in the nation. Although two parties tend 
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to dominate, there are many parties elected to the Canadian Parliament. Like in the United 
Kingdom only two parties tend to compete effectively in a single district. For example, in 
Quebec these would be the Parti Quebecois and the Quebec Liberal Party, while in Alberta these 
would be the Progressive Conservatives and the Wildrose Alliance Party. 
Campaign Finance Regulations There are two dominant laws governing Canadian 
elections and campaign finance. The first is the Canadian Elections Act, CEA, of 1974, which 
was amended in 2004. The second law passed, also in 1974, is the Election Expense Act.  These 
two laws have implemented spending limits on parties and campaigns, instituted contribution 
limits, and increased disclosure requirements.  Additionally, tax credits for contributions were 
put in place to encourage individual rather than corporate donations and public subsidies were 
established.   
To limit outside expenditures in elections, groups that spend $500 ($500) dollars or more 
on advertising in an election must register as a party.  To provide some perspective on what a 
similar law in the US would mean, unions, corporations, and individuals such as the Koch 
bothers would have to register in the US as their own parties. Another limiting factor on outside 
groups influencing elections is that corporations and unions are banned from making direct 
contributions to campaigns. This differs from the UK and the US. In the UK, direct contributions 
are allowed, and in the US there are a plethora of avenues for corporations to donate and spend 
money beyond the party or candidate campaigns, especially since Citizens United.
15
 
In Canada, only two bodies set and monitor campaign finance laws and regulations.  The 
first body that generates or changes campaign finance law is Parliament, specifically the House 
of Commons.  The second body is Elections Canada, which is an independent government 
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organization that administers and monitors elections as well as enforces established laws and 
regulations.  Although there is an active court system in Canada, the courts have given wider 
discretion to the will of parliament as expressed by passed legislation than in the US. This is due 
to a provision in the Canadian constitution that allows the government to infringe on the rights of 
its citizens in specific sets of instances when balanced against potential or existent corruption.  
 
Table 3: Relevant Canadian Legislation & Court Rulings 
Bills & Rulings Language Ramifications 
Election Expenses Act 
(1974) 
 Established candidate and outside 
group expenditure limits 
 Increased disclosure requirements 
 Created incentives for individuals 
to donate to campaigns 
Put in place the modern Canadian 
campaign finance regime and 
introduced the first political 
finance limits into the system 
Libman v Quebec (1997) 
 Struck down portions of the 1989 
Election Act 
 Indicated that limits established to 
ensure a more fair campaign 
would be acceptable 
“…indicated…the Supreme 
Court would accept limitations 
on advertising expenditures, 
setting up the CEA’s eventual 
passage.” (Boatright 2011: 75) 
Canada Elections Act 
(2000, 2003, 2007) 
 Established contribution limits 
 Established a public funding 
system 
Limited contributions and 
implemented a public funding 
scheme in an attempt to make the 
system “more fair” 
Harper v Attorney General 
(2004) 
 Declared expenditure limits a 
violation the freedom of 
expression guarantee 
 Ruled infringement justifiable 
under the balancing rights 
provision and upheld the 
limitations 
Ensured expenditure limits would 
remain in place 
Accountability Act (2007) 
 Outlawed contributions by 
unions or corporations 
 Indexed individual contribution 
limits to inflation  
 Established limits on 
contributions to leadership 
races 
Reinforced existent regulations 
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The Comparison 
The broad similarities between these three systems allow for a comparison of campaign 
finance structures between the countries while holding the basic electoral system constant.  At 
the national level every seat in each country is filled by use of the first past the post system, 
which means that only one person is elected per district and that person wins by receiving a 
plurality of the vote. Additionally, each country has two dominant parties competing against 
each other on the national stage—one of which falls left of center and the other of which falls 
right of center on the left-right continuum of party ideology.  Even when more parties exist either 
at the national or sub-national level only two parties are competitive in a given district. What 
does vary between countries is the number and caliber of offices in competition, the focus of or 
drive behind campaigns, and the length of the elections season, the size of the various districts in 
both population represented and land mass, the ratio of public to private funds.  The same basic 
electoral forces are at work, which allows those to be held constant, while other factors differ; 
those factors are examined to identify how similar electoral structures can produce such different 
campaign finance regimes. This can be done in a myriad of ways but will be specifically done by 
comparing increases and decreases in allowed and real contributions and spending between (like) 
elections and comparison to each country’s GDP.   
By ‘like elections,’ I mean that when considering contributions and expenditures, not just 
what regulations allows in each instance, a division will be made in the US between totals in a 
presidential election cycle and a midterm election cycle. This needs to be done because the 
presidential election cycle, including contributions and expenditures in the presidential, 
senatorial, and congressional election, generates between 50% and 90% more campaign 
spending than the total amount spent in midterm election cycles.  This is different than in either 
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the UK or Canada because the national governments in those countries are elected together; the 
entire parliament is (re)elected at the same time and a new government is formed from that 
parliament. There are three different types of elections in the UK that nationally occur in the UK; 
these are general elections, devolved elections, and European Parliamentary elections. However, 
only the UK general election will be discussed in this paper because it is the only body that 
represents the interests of the UK domestically as a whole. In Canada, the closest to a midterm 
election or an off cycle election to elect replacement MP that occurs is the occasional by-
election. However, Canadian by-elections are only held for seats where the individual originally 
elected must step down and his or her term has not expired. This means that a total of four 
election types will be discussed: the US presidential election cycles (including both 
congressional and the presidential election), the US midterm election cycles, the UK general 
election, and the Canadian general election. 
Regulatory Framework 
The five identified influences differentiating and potentially shaping the campaign 
finance regimes in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada can be broken into two 
broad categories: influences on the construction of the regulatory framework and influences on 
setting controls on spending and contributions. Influences on the overall regulatory framework 
shape the overall structure of the regime. They are the type and number of elected offices and the 
focal point (or central actor) of an election. Within the structure of the regime are specific 
limitations concerning how much can be spent or how much can be contributed. These 
regulations have occupied a special place in many regimes either because they have been 
challenged in the courts or been viewed as one of the best lines of defense against corruption. 
The limit or boundary setting influences are the length and predictability of the elections, size of 
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electoral districts, and the ratio of private to public funds used in an election. Limits in each 
campaign finance regime are set for different actors and regulate different actions. To introduce 
and then examine the soundness of various assumptions about potential influence, each factor 
will be examined within the context of the manifest structural realities in each system. First, the 
regulatory framework and associated influences will be examined. Then the limiting influences 
will be examined.  
Types & Number of Offices Being Elected  
Citizens elect many officials into office for varying levels of government. At the national 
level, the common office that is directly elected across democracies is the lower house of the 
legislature. Less frequently, the upper legislative house and executive are elected by the people. 
For campaign finance, this means that the number and type of concurrently elected offices must 
be taken into consideration when writing regulations. Intuitively one would expect the campaign 
finance regime to reflect the regulatory pattern already established in this respect. For example, 
in countries where congressional and presidential elections occur simultaneously the regulatory 
framework should provide specifics on conduct for each type of election and dictate inter-
election conduct. Systems of this type should see more money raised and spent than systems with 
only one elected body, because a greater number of races are being run at the same time. On the 
other hand, countries with only one election occurring in a district only require regulations to 
govern actions in that election.  
These intuitions are supported empirically. Regulations can be broadly grouped into two 
sets: horizontal and vertical. Horizontal regulations govern the series of elections held 
concerning the same governing body (ex. House of Representatives in the US) and elections for a 
single office. These regulations span from the nomination process to the general election to the 
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leadership races. One example of this can be seen in the Canada Elections Act where there are 
separate sections of the law that specifically addresses what should procedurally happen at each 
step of the process and who can contribute and spend money at each step.  All three countries’ 
laws contain this type of regulation. 
While the UK, Canada, and the US all have horizontal regulations, only the US’ laws 
contain vertical regulations. Vertical regulations govern interactions between concurrent 
elections for different offices. For example, in the United States, the vertical tiers would be 
congressional, senatorial, and presidential elections and the interactions allowed or forbidden 
between those campaigns; they determine what types of coordinated campaigns can occur. A 
byproduct of these regulations is the existence of the coordinated campaign and a higher overall 
bill at the end of the election because despite all campaigning in a single district each individual 
campaign needs to act for itself.  
Focal Point of the Campaign 
One drastic difference between the three countries is the power distribution existing 
between parties, candidates, individuals, and outside organizations. The power distribution 
among actors in a campaign can be described by identifying the focal point of a campaign. The 
focal point is the central actor in the campaign who garners the greatest attention and has the 
greatest ability to influence the execution of the campaign. Across countries the two standard 
focal points are the party and the candidate. A third focal point may be interest groups or outside 
organizations.  
Theoretically this is an important distinction because whoever is the functional center of 
the campaign will influence regulations surrounding elections, the flow of money an election, the 
focus of transparency efforts, and the likelihood of non-establishment candidates being elected to 
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office. For example, in a country with a first-past-the-post electoral system where parties are the 
center of the campaign regulations, regulatory agencies may place greater restrictions on the 
movements of individual candidates and minimize the ability of outside organizations to effect 
the election. The system might also emphasize the transparency of party spending and 
fundraising. Additionally, whoever the focal point of a campaign is may impact the 
responsiveness of elected officials to their constituents. On this front, party centered systems 
may degrade the responsiveness because the candidate’s power is diminished. Before further 
discussing the ramifications of the focal point, the locus of the campaign must be identified. 
Identifying the Focal Point In both Canada and the United Kingdom (beginning in the 
1880s during what Pinto-Duschinsky calls the Plutocratic Era), the party, not the individual 
candidates or politicians, drives the campaign, including their candidates’ campaigns. This is 
most likely a byproduct of the fact that both of these countries are parliamentary—not 
presidential—systems where a majority of the parliament, usually a single majority party, elects 
the PM and his or her government. The PM and his or her government (practically) run the 
country as they see fit, with little movement for individual politicians. The opposition party or 
parties can only highlight the majority’s perceived missteps and questionable policies—
effectively positioning themselves for the next election. If a politician is a member of the 
opposition party, he or she can do almost nothing. Additionally, interest groups have gained less 
of a foothold. While this is a plausible explanation of the saliency of the party in a parliamentary 
system, it does not entirely explain why the party, and not the individual candidate, directs the 
elections. Parties used to dominate elections in the United States, a presidential system, as well. 
Parties dominated US elections from the 1830s to the 1890s, the Golden Age for party 
organizations; however, today the power and role of the party has been significantly scaled back 
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and been replaced in campaigns by individual candidates. During the Golden Age of the parties, 
loyalties of the average member and the candidates were to the party. It was the party that would 
get them elected; it was the party that provided their supporters with necessary services; and it 
was the party that provided members with jobs. By the 1890s and early 1900s, some activists, 
namely the progressives, began to be driven by the desire to limit the influence of parties on 
politics (Hershey 2013). The progressives were successful in passing a number of pieces of 
legislation that limited the power of the parties, which began a devolution of power to the 
candidates and individual politicians that has lasted until the 1990s. During this time, outside 
groups have also increased their presence in elections through individual and outside 
expenditures. In attempts to counteract this devolution, party leaders have looked for different 
ways to the regain control—and they have taken back some of their former power. One way they 
did this was through the use of and proliferation of “new” campaign finance techniques (i.e. soft 
money and leadership PACs). However, the complete dominance of the parties has not yet been 
reestablished and will continue to be challenged by the already existing structure. 
Evidence of this can be seen in the rise and survival of the Tea Party—a relatively new 
group of issue activists and a new caucus in the House. The Tea Party came into existence 
shortly after President Barack Obama took office in 2009, apparently as a reactionary measure to 
a unified democratic government in a time of great uncertainty. Despite expectations that it 
would be a short lived movement that would devolve into call lists of potential activists upon the 
election of a Republican House, the Tea Party remains an active political movement. Many local 
organizations continue to meet, discuss issues, and track issues at all levels of government. The 
espoused goal of many of these local organizations is to keep their Republican representatives 
and the party purely conservative in their rhetoric, legislation, and company. However, the Tea 
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Party does not have a national, or often even a single statewide, organization(s). It is a 
conglomeration of independent grass roots groups, interest groups, a caucus in the House, and 
attempts to use their people-power by the established party; every level of this has been spurred 
on by the media (most notably Fox) (Skocpol and Williamson 2012).  
Despite its fractious nature, some generalizations can still be made. First, most Tea 
partiers either have worked on campaigns/in politics before or have been community organizers. 
Second, although most vote Republican and some may have worked with the Republican party 
before, Tea Partiers are not establishment Republicans. Third, they will actively fight against 
(establishment) Republicans if they believe the current candidates, politicians, and/or party 
structure are not holding true to conservative values. For the Republican party, this has already 
presented problems; Tea party candidates have beaten or threaten to challenge established 
candidates in the primary. One tangible result of this is a perceptible shift to the right by the 
Republican members of Congress (Skocpol and Williamson 2012).  
Among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, party strength relative to 
individual candidate strength varies. Parties remain the dominant actor in elections in both 
Canada and the United Kingdom. In the United States, this is reversed. Despite a rise in the 
power and influence of the parties, the candidate still controls and drives his or her own 
campaign. The weakness of the parties is continually highlighted in American politics by the 
strength of the Tea Party movement, which now has representation in Congress, and the failures 
of Congressional leadership to deliver a unified party vote on some important pieces of 
legislation. This relationship between the party and the candidate/individual seems to have 
important results for the codification and formation of each country’s campaign finance regimes; 
the regulations mirror party/candidate dominance relations. 
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The Focal Point and Finance Whichever entity is the focal point of the election season 
will influence where the money flows in an election and what financial regulations are placed on 
parties and candidates during the campaign. Structurally a bias can be observed for either party-
centered or candidate-centered campaigns by noting what contribution options are available to 
citizens, what spending options are available to parties and candidates, and who else is allowed 
to campaign during the election season.  
Theoretically, there should be an observed difference in codified regulations between 
systems that are candidate focused and those that are party focused. Party focused campaigns 
should have fewer restrictions placed on the party than the candidate, greater funding and 
spending possibilities for the parties, and a minimal ability for outside organizations to influence 
the election. On the opposite end, an idealized candidate focused campaign has greater 
restrictions placed on the party than the candidate, more funding and spending avenues for 
candidates, and the ability for outside organizations to spend money on electioneering and 
contribute to various candidates. A more realistic picture of candidate focused campaigns is that 
the power of the party is simply augmented by similar restrictions placed on both parties and 
candidates and few to no restrictions on outside group spending. This picture sees the power of 
the party diminished by increasing the flexibility of actions of the candidates and outside groups 
and individuals. The regulations in Canada, the US, and the UK do seem to indicate the validity 
of these assumptions as seen in the overview in table 4. However, they also indicate that their 
laws and location of the focal point is more influenced than this simplistic assumption. An 
additional wrinkle, important to the US but almost irrelevant to the US or UK, is the possibility 
of unregulated independent spending and/or regulations applying only to parties or candidates. If 
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outside groups are unregulated while parties and candidates are heavily regulated, then this may 
give rise to a third potential system; an interest group centered system. 
In the United States, campaigns are candidate centered and driven; however there is an 
increasingly strong party apparatus behind the elections. Citizens can contribute to a myriad of 
groups that participate in campaigning that represent candidates, issues (such as the National 
Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action), and parties. Additionally, they are not limited 
to donating by their declared party affiliation and many fundraising activities occur outside of the 
direct purview of the party (for example leadership PACs, bundling, and joint fundraising 
committees). Direct party contributions to candidate campaigns are limited, while PACs and 
independent candidate committees can contribute competitive sums of money to individual 
candidates and spend money on electioneering on their own. Parties, candidates, and issues 
groups can run advertisements, distribute literature, and campaign. Financially this means that 
candidates are at least as powerful as, if not more powerful than, the party in the United States. 
However, with the popularization of leadership PACs in the 1990s and the development of 
Congressional campaign committees, the parties have made a resurgence in the US. These 
groups do not exist in the UK or Canada and may in fact emphasize the relative weakness of the 
party in the US, because in the US parties need to form subsidiary groups to regain some control. 
This is drastically different from either Canada or the United Kingdom where the central party 
command has a relatively strong grip on party members. 
In the United Kingdom, parties, not individual candidates, drive the campaigns. This 
reality is reflected in the regulations governing the campaign finance regime. First, outside 
organizations are limited in the amount they can spend. In the 2010 UK Parliamentary general 
election, outside groups, also referred to as third parties where the parties and candidates would  
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Table 4: What the actors can do 
In… 
Citizens can 
contribute to… 
Parties can… Candidates can… 
Outside organizations & 
Independent Groups 
can… 
United 
States 
Limited 
contributions to 
candidate 
committees, parties, 
PACs, Joint 
Fundraising 
Committees, 
SuperPACs, etc. and 
unlimited 
contributions to 
independent groups 
Unlimited expenditures 
on television 
advertisements, send 
literature, and contact 
voters but cannot be 
claimed to be endorsed 
by a candidate; limited 
contributions to 
state/local parties and 
make limited donations 
to candidates 
Unlimited 
expenditures on 
television 
advertisements, send 
literature, and contact 
voters; limited 
contributions  to both 
other candidates’ 
campaigns and the 
party 
run television 
advertisements, send 
literature, contact voters 
(the rules vary on how and 
if a group can explicitly 
endorse a candidate), and 
contribute limited amounts 
to both other candidates’ 
campaigns and the party.  
Can spend unlimited 
amounts of money 
supporting or opposing 
candidate as long as 
operating independently. 
United 
Kingdom 
Unlimited 
contributions to 
parties and 
candidates  
Limited expenditures 
(spend a maximum of 
£30,000 ($47,3905) per 
constituency contested) 
on advertising, 
unsolicited materials 
sent to electors,  
some types of transport, 
public meetings,  staff 
costs, accommodation, 
and administrative costs 
Limited expenditures  
(£25,000 ($38,629) 
(+constituent 
allowance) during the 
long campaign and 
£7500 ($11,847.46) 
(+constituent 
allowance) during the 
short campaign) on 
advertising, unsolicited 
materials sent to 
electors,  
some types of 
transport, public 
meetings,  staff costs, 
accommodation, and 
administrative costs 
Limited expenditures (£500 
($789.83) per race) and 
must register with the 
Electoral Commission if 
they plan to spend or do 
spend over £10,000 
($15,797 
Canada 
Limited 
contributions to 
registered parties,  
leadership 
contestants, & 
candidates  
Limited expenditures,  
dependent on the size of 
the districts their 
candidates are running 
in, on the promotion of 
their candidate and 
unlimited donations to 
candidates 
Limited expenditures,  
dependent on the 
number of registered 
electors and 
geographic size of the 
district, on the 
promotion of their 
campaigns 
Limited expenditures (a 
total of $197,100 
($197,160) or $3,942 
($3945) in a single district) 
on advertising 
The information for this table was taken from Elections Canada, FEC, opsensecrets.org, and from the UK Electoral Commission. 
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be referred to as the first and second parties, could spend a maximum of £500 ($790) per 
race.When compared to the United States where such groups could spend anywhere from $2600 
($3816) to an unlimited amount (depending on what type of organization is “donating” or 
spending the money), this is a small amount. This means that the overall campaign is dependent 
on two, not three, categories of actors: the candidate and the party. Second, although the parties 
can spend less on a single race than individual candidates, they can allocate their funds in such a 
way as to spend more in contested races and funnel donors to their candidates. Additionally, 
because campaign spending is relegated to the 4 weeks plus a potential additional 4 to 5 months 
the party has greater flexibility to keep a small year round staff. 
Like in the UK, Canadian campaigns center on the party, not the candidate.  Expenditure 
caps are placed on third party and outside group participants that are comparatively low 
compared to the US. where such caps either do not exist or are higher because such spending is 
considered an in kind contribution to a campaign and is factored into the overall contribution 
limit. Additionally, the cap for expenditures in a single district on advertising by an outside 
organization is lower than the cap for either candidates or parties. In Canada, the maximum 
amount a candidate and a party can spend in an election can vary widely between contests and 
how many/which contests the party runs candidates in because the maximum allowed is 
determined by the number of registered voters in a riding, which do not have to be of equal 
geographic size or population.  For example in 2006, the limits on candidate campaign 
expenditures ranged from approximately $62,000 ($47,990) to $106,000 ($82,048). In any single 
race, a candidate can spend more than the party; however, the party’s allotment that can be spent 
in an election is determined by the total number of registered voters (electors) in all the districts 
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in which their candidates run multiplied by $0.70.
16
 This sum can be allocated as the parties see 
fit. Additionally, transfers of funds or goods from the party to the candidate or the candidate to 
the party are not listed as either donations or expenditures. For the party-candidate power 
balance, the compilation of these regulations means: outside organizations are limited in their 
influence and would do better to either contribute to a party or start a new party; and candidates 
often become dependent on party funds to bankroll their campaigns because parties can transfer 
and reallocate funds in accordance to need.  
Structurally, another way to identify the focal point is to look at who the electoral 
commissions and outside organizations identify as the important actors and focus transparency 
efforts on. The easiest way to do this is to look at the various election commissions and how they 
present, or do not present, data on campaign finance. All three nations have clearly analyzed and 
cleanly presented analysis of party spending and fundraising in their most recent general 
elections. The depth of analysis varies from simply breaking out how much a party spent in the 
election to a breakdown of how much was spent on different kinds of expenses (e.g., advertising, 
fundraising events, etc.). However, only the US attempts to present such statistics based on the 
contest and candidate for federal races. The FEC translates their raw data into graphs showing 
the bare bones of campaign spending and contributions on a race by race basis. Greater detail is 
given in the description of the presidential election, but information for every federal race run 
(including Congressional and Senatorial races) is presented. Additionally, only the US has 
multiple watchdog organizations that download and translate the raw data available from the 
FEC, the US electoral commission, to further promote transparency of individual donors and 
expenditures by candidates. By simply looking through these websites, an institutional bias for 
party or candidate can be observed where party-centered campaign systems attempt to shed 
                                                          
16
 2007 Canadian dollars and is adjusted each election cycle for inflation in accordance to the CPI 
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greater light on party activity while the candidate-centered campaign system attempts to shed 
light on both party activity and candidate activity. 
The United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada have each set up different 
regulations influenced by the conscious or unconscious decision to preserve a candidate centered 
or party centered electoral system. There are four entities affected by these regulations: citizens, 
candidates, parties, and outside organizations. In both party centered systems, outside 
organizations are severely limited in the amount they are allowed to spend per race in an election 
and the amount they can spend overall. Additionally, in these countries there are significantly 
fewer types of groups that constituents may contribute to, which forces them to donate to either 
candidates or parties rather than outside organizations or a plethora of leadership PACs. In the 
candidate centered system, the amount parties can contribute to candidates is limited, while in 
party centered systems it is not. This is significant because if parties cannot directly contribute 
unlimitedly then candidates have less of an incentive to directly tow the party line. Additionally, 
this may be the case because the greater control over contributions and ability the party has to 
control funds, the more individual candidates are beholden to the party for financial assistance. 
By limiting the amount a party may contribute, the influence the party may use is lessened. Also, 
by not limiting outside organizations, the number of possible groups an individual can contribute 
to increases which in turn may decrease the likelihood that an individual donates to a party.  
The Focal Point and the Operation of Democracy The driving force behind the 
campaign has ramifications for the operation of democracy in these countries. Namely it impacts 
the responsiveness levels of individual politicians to the desires and needs of their constituents 
and alters how constituents make their voices heard at the polls. This manifests itself in two 
ways. First, it influences what group(s) politicians must rely on for their power. All politicians in 
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a democracy rely on both their party and their constituents for power and the ability to achieve 
office; additionally some if not all must work with outside interest groups. However, the balance 
among those pulls could impact individual loyalties and to whom the politician is primarily 
responsive. Second, it influences how citizens can impact the responsiveness of their politicians 
by necessitating constituents vote for a candidate from a different party to take office rather than 
choosing a different member of the same party to run. 
In party centered systems, individual politicians, while elected by their constituents, rely 
on the party, be it the constituency or local party or the national party, for their nomination to run 
for office. As a result, politicians may not be capable of responding quickly adapting to the 
demands of their constituents or acquiescing to their demands if what the party wants and what 
their constituents want are opposed. The ramification of this at the polls may then be the voting 
in of “new” or outside parties to power, because the existing parties cannot adapt quickly 
enough.  The tendency has been for different parties to rise up in party centered systems like 
Canada and the U.K, instead of party realignments as might happen in a candidate centered 
systems In Canada, the NDP has recently overtaken the Liberal Party as the major left wing 
party. In the United Kingdom, this trend can be seen over the life span of their three major 
parties today. The Liberals and Conservatives rose to prominence during the Aristocratic era but 
became powerful as a party—not a group of individuals—in the 1890s. However, with the 
introduction of universal manhood (and womanhood) suffrage neither existing party was willing 
to realign themselves to broaden its base. As a result, the Labour party came onto the political 
scene in the 1920s and became one of the two major parties during World War II (Pinto-
Duschinsky 1981). A similar process occurred with the growth of Republican and Democratic 
parties in the US. This may seem to overthrow this observation, but upon the introduction and 
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growth of the parties in the US campaigns were party centered—not candidate centered as they 
are today. The United States’ system has changed overtime.  
In candidate centered systems, politicians and their constituents have greater control over 
who a party’s nominee for that office is. As a result, politicians must respond to the 
idiosyncrasies in their districts, not just tow the party line, because the people have greater input 
throughout the electoral process. In some systems, such as the United States, the people officially 
nominate the party members who will run in the general election in a primary. This means that a 
member of the same party who currently holds the seat for a given district could be voted out 
before the general election and replaced by a different member of their own party. Citizens can 
make their voices heard on the variation of views within a party and can demand politicians 
tailor their rhetoric and politics to their specific area; those who do not do this can be voted out. 
While the two major parties may control the government or parts of the government at different 
points, parties realign to accommodate new groups and factions in the electorate instead of 
allowing an outside or third party to gain momentum. This has been seen in the United States; 
the “definitions” of and coalitions comprising the Democratic and Republican parties change 
over time. For example, take the evolution of party politics in the Southern United States, which 
can be more specifically defined as the 11 states that seceded from the Union in the Civil War. In 
the late 19
th
 and for most of the 20
th
 century the South was a solidly Democratic area. By the 
mid-20
th
 century, many southerners became known as the blue, or yellow, dog Democrats, but 
still voted members of the Democratic Party into power as long as the Democrats did not raise 
the issue of racial equality or segregation. Once the Democrats did challenge institutional 
segregation nationally, but targeted at the South, the South slowly became a Republican stalwart. 
Today the highest concentration of Tea Party groups are in the South. The parties have 
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responded through the adaptation of their individual members to the concerns of their particular 
constituents in these areas.  
The focal point and driver of elections impacts the overall operation of democracy and 
specifically the campaign finance regimes in countries. While not mandated explicitly by law, 
they have evolved simultaneously—but not always harmoniously—with regulatory legislation in 
these countries. Whether the party or the candidate is the center and focus of the campaign 
influences who is placed under greater restrictions and the influence afforded to outside groups; 
it affects and is a product of the structure of the regulations and campaign. As a result, how 
parties and candidates respond to changing demographics and new issue groups varies depending 
on the power dynamic between the party and individual politician. However, the focal point is 
not the only structural determining factor as to how a campaign finance regime is structured. 
Summary 
In combination, the type of election and driving force behind a campaign erect the basic 
framework any other regulation must work within. Specifically, for the formation of a campaign 
finance regime countries must discern between horizontal and vertical regulations for candidates, 
parties, individuals, and outside organizations. Within those regulations, the focal point of action 
at each point is centered around and filtered through the lens of who the driving force behind a 
campaign is. For the United Kingdom this means that there is a legal differentiation between the 
nominating process, general election, and leadership contests with a bias towards parties being 
the strongest actor at any point in the process. The same can be said of Canada. In both systems, 
the movements of outside organizations are limited, and candidates have some flexibility while 
parties have the greatest flexibility in the allocation of their resources—most notably money. 
Conversely for the United States at the federal level there is a legal differentiation between the 
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nominating process, general election, and the different races with a bias towards individual 
candidates being at least as strong as the party in driving a campaign. Additionally, outside 
groups in the US have greater latitude in their actions in during a campaign. Legally this can be 
seen through comparable regulations being placed on both candidates and parties, and outside 
organizations are allowed a wide range of motion from being heavily regulated to having few 
limits placed upon them.   
Setting Boundaries 
Within the general framework, campaign finance regimes are centered on setting 
boundaries by restricting the actions of various actors in the campaign to raise and spend money. 
Whose action is bounded and to what extent he or she is bounded is broadly determined by the 
inclusion of a right to freedom of speech in a written constitution and the level of political 
activism of federal judges. Notably the three major boundaries that have been tested in court 
cases have been expenditure limits, contribution limits, and public funding. In the United States, 
where the constitution guarantees the protection of freedom of speech and the Supreme Court, 
whose role includes the functions of a constitutional court, is relatively politically active, limits 
on campaign expenditures by individual candidate committees and outside independent groups 
(where the name of the candidate the group is supporting is not mentioned) or individuals have 
been deemed unconstitutional while limits on individual contributions to candidates, parties, and 
some PACs have been categorized as a justified limit on free speech. The precedent for this was 
set in Buckley v Valeo where the majority decision cited fears of corruption—be it actual or 
perceived—as a valid reason to curtail free speech. More recently, the Supreme Court struck 
down Arizona’s system of public funding as unconstitutional citing a violation of free speech and 
legalized unlimited spending by certain outside organizations in elections (Arizona Free 
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Enterprise Club PAC v Bennett 2011). Other cases challenging the limits on free speech by 
campaign finance regulations are making their way to the US Supreme Court. 
Like the United States, Canada also has a federal court akin to a constitutional court, but 
it is not nearly as active in the realm of campaign finance and electoral regulations as the US 
Supreme Court. Additionally, while the Canadian constitution includes protection of freedom of 
speech for its citizens like the US, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms also includes a 
balancing rights provision. The balancing rights provision allows the government to override a 
constitutionally protected right if and only if the objective is “of sufficient importance” and the 
method to achieve the objective is rational. As a result, in Harper v Canada (2004) the Canadian 
Supreme Court did not strike down limits on outside spending in elections although it did 
recognize such limits violate the constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech. Unlike either 
the US or Canada, the UK has not had an active federal court system until recently. This means 
that the governments in both the UK and Canada have greater latitude in setting boundaries on 
campaign finance than in the United States.  
For boundary setting within their campaign finance regimes, this means that: the United 
States is restricted to the use of limits on contributions; the United Kingdom has no such 
restrictive force but only utilizes campaign expenditure limits; and Canada uses both despite 
having a potentially restrictive force. To understand the influences affecting those limits and 
boundaries on what money converted into another type of resource, the size of the electoral 
district, the length of the election season, and the ratio of public to private funds used in an 
election must be examined. 
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Size of the (Various) Districts 
The size of an official’s district is a direct byproduct of how many representatives each 
country designed to have in their lower house given its population and how districts are required 
to be drawn. District or constituency size can be quantified in one of two ways: by population or 
by geographical size. Across and within the three countries, the size of different districts, ridings, 
and constituencies varies. They have districts that range from geographically small with 
relatively few constituents to physically large with many people contained within their bounds. 
For campaign finance, the size of the districts presents a logistical challenge to contact voters and 
constituents that must be faced by parties, candidates, and regulatory bodies. Thus it appears 
logical that in a larger district more money, or other resources, must be devoted to and in a 
smaller a district less money, or other resources, must be expended in an election. In the US, 
where TV advertising consumes the bulk of campaign expenditures, these figures are also 
dependent on how expensive a given media market is. 
Candidate expenditure limits in the United Kingdom and Canada follow this logic. As of 
2009, the British candidate expenditure limit is calculated by first multiplying the number of 
electors (registered constituents) by either 5p for a borough/burgh or 7p for a county and adding 
that sum to a baseline figure of £25,000 ($38,629) in the long campaign and £7500 ($11,847) in 
the short campaign. Borough districts standardly have higher population densities than county 
districts; this means that the geographically larger districts have a slightly higher per constituent 
rate to compensate for the greater dispersion of the constituents. In 2010, districts ranged in size 
from approximately 55,000 electors to 110,000 electors (UK Electoral Commission).  
In Canada, a similar but more complex system has been developed. The party expense 
limit is $0.70 multiplied by the number of electors in every district that the party is running a 
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candidate. The maximum expense limit for candidates takes into account both population size 
and geographic size of the districts. First, a maximum is calculated by the number of electors in 
the district: “(a) $2.07 for each of the first 15,000 electors; (b) $1.04 for each of the next 10,000 
electors; and (c) $0.52 for each of the remaining electors.”(Canada Elections Act, 440) Then if 
the district contains less than 10 electors per square kilometer an additional sum is added to the 
maximum. Canada also does not require each district to have an approximately equal number of 
electors, which are classified as qualified voters in the UK and Canada, and in fact requires some 
districts to have fewer than the average (Elections Canada). With the construction of scaled 
expenditure limits, both countries seemingly recognize the basic logic that the more people and 
the more space a district contains, then the more money that is needed to run an effective 
campaign. In the UK this may change because there have been proposals to redraw constituency 
boundaries with respect not to the traditional county and borough lines but with respect to 
population numbers. If this happens, then the expenditure limits for candidates in differing 
districts should be more equal than they currently are. In contrast to this, House districts in the 
US contain equal numbers of constituents except for where the Constitution guarantees at least 
one House seat despite the state not having 1/435
th
 of the population.  
This logic can also be examined by looking at the average spent per elector in each 
country by the driving actors or focal point of the campaign. The most amount of money was 
spent per voter in the US, where the greatest number of votes is cast, which indicates that there is 
some validity to the intuitions. However, more money as spent per elector in the Canadian 2011 
general election than in the 2010 UK election (Table 5). This may be explained by many factors. 
The next two most obvious factors would be the length and predictability of the election season 
and amount and kind of public subsidies offered in each country.  
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Table 5: The Cost of a Vote 
Election Total Spent 
Number of 
Votes Cast 
Amount Spent 
Per Voter 
2012 US 
Election (Total) 
 $ 2,776,569,055.00  130,306,739  $            21.31  
2012 US 
Election 
(House) 
$ 1,109,013,161.00 130,306,739 $               8.51 
2011 Canadian 
Election 
 $      67,348,040.64  14,823,408  $              4.54  
2010 UK 
Election 
 $      17,283,480.49  29,594,591  $              0.58  
These numbers were taken from the Elections Canada, FEC, opsensecrets.org, and 
from the UK Electoral Commission. 
 
Length and Predictability of the Election Season  
In simple terms, the definition of an election season is the span of time where candidates 
and/or parties campaign for office culminating in an election; there does not need to be a 
specified and legal beginning to the season, but many countries do regulate this. Partially as a 
result of these differing regulations, the actual length of the election season varies by country. 
One common determinant in the length of the season and the amount of regulations placed on 
when campaigning can occur is the “predictability” of when an election will occur. A 
“predictable” election season is one that occurs regularly and on a prearranged schedule. In this 
respect, the US has a predictable season while Canada and the UK have potentially un-
predictable seasons because elections can be called before the mandated time limit for their 
respective House of Commons.  
For the campaign finance regime, this has at least one expected result; a long election 
season and a predictable time table should allow and necessitate more money to be spent and 
raised while a shorter (potentially) unpredictable election season places a time constraint on the 
amount that can be spent and reduces the amount that can be and needs to be raised. The UK, 
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Canada, and the US each have different levels of predictability and campaign for different 
lengths of time: in the UK, there is a four week long campaign; in Canada, there is a minimum of 
a five week long elections season with an average season lasting 44 days in the last 10 years; and 
in the US, there is a permanent campaign with contributions being recorded in two yearlong 
election cycles. Of these three countries, the US has the most permanently stable electoral 
calendar, while both the UK and Canada have semi-stable electoral calendars. The reason they 
are classified as semi-stable is that they are both mandated to have an election at least every five 
years, but have the possibility of holding general elections before then. Intuitively this means that 
the most should be actually spent in US general elections, second most in Canadian general 
elections, and the least in UK general elections. As can be seen in table 6 below there is an 
observable pattern, or at least correlation, that affirms this intuition and reasonable expectation. 
Table 6: Expenditures Per Voter In Most Recent General Election 
 
US 2012 Presidential 
Election 
Canada 2011 General 
Election 
UK 2010 General 
Election 
Total Expenditures per Voter $     21.31 $      4.54 $      0.58 
Non-Media Expenditures per 
Voter 
$     14.43 $      2.37 $      0.48 
These numbers were taken from the Elections Canada, FEC, opsensecrets.org, and from the UK Electoral Commission. 
  
An additional legal ramification differing lengths may have, is it may dictate in part what 
limits may be placed on candidates, parties and citizens – whether those limits are on how much 
and when someone or some group can contribute and how much and when parties may spend 
money on the election. Unfortunately for the purposes of comparison in this case, the three 
countries do not share a common practice of setting either or both caps on contributions and 
expenditures. In fact, of these three countries only Canada employs caps on both contributions 
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and expenditures. The United States has strict contribution limits for all individuals if giving to a 
candidate or party but not to an independent outside group such as a SuperPAC; the US does not 
have a spending limit.
17
 The United Kingdom places expenditure limits on both parties and 
candidates during an election, but not on individual donors. This means that Canada can be 
compared to both countries. For means of comparison, it should be noted that both Canada and 
the United Kingdom record and regulate donations on an annual not biannual basis like the 
United States. Additionally, the United States regulates by election so the limits restart for the  
primary and general elections; there is an overall limit for each cycle. 
 
If the intuition that longer campaigns necessitate more money, the caps on contributions 
and expenditures should reflect this: the US should have higher contribution limits than Canada; 
and Canada should have higher expenditure limits than the UK As can be seen in table 7 this 
holds true. The United States allows individuals to contribute more than Canada over an election 
                                                          
17
 There is a limit to how much presidential candidates may spend if, and only if, they accept and use public funds 
for their campaign. 
Table 7: 2013 Contribution and Expenditure Limits  by Country  
  United States Canada United Kingdom 
Contribution Limit to Candidate 
$5200 $1200 N/A 
Contribution Limit to Party 
$64,800 (national) & 
$20,00 (state/local) $1200 N/A 
Expenditure Limit for Candidate 
N/A 
$2.07 per elector 
for the first 15,000 
+ $1.04 per elector 
for the next 10,000 
+ $0.52 per each 
remaining elector 
£7500 ($11,847.46) + 
Constituent allowance 
Expenditure Limit for Party 
N/A $0.70 per elector 
£30,000 ($47,489.85) 
per contested race 
These numbers were taken from the Elections Canada, FEC, opsensecrets.org, and from the UK Electoral 
Commission. 
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cycle or a single year to both parties and candidates. Additionally, Canada has higher 
expenditure limits than the United Kingdom. This suggests that length of the season may 
influence the amount spent.  
 
Ratio of Public to Private Funds 
The third structural influence, which ties both previous influences together, is the division 
of public and private funds spent in an election on campaigning.
18
 In all three countries public 
funding for national level election campaigns was introduced, in varying levels and ways, in the 
1970s. Each cited curbing corruption, minimizing the effects of rocketing campaign costs, and 
increasing fairness in election as justifications. However, each country chose a different manner 
of attempting to affect this change within the limits of the driver of the campaigns and length of 
electoral season.  
There are different types of public funding options: subsidies, reimbursements, matching 
funds, and allowances. Although the different types of funding have general definitions, they 
have specific meanings in the context of public funding. Subsidies are governmental assistance 
given to campaigns that defray the cost of material expenses. Generally this is done by ensuring 
political campaigns receive discounted television advertisement and airtime prices, providing for 
a set amount of advertisements either over the airwaves or via the mail, and/or through the free 
use of public space for campaign meetings. Reimbursements are after the fact payments that 
cover part or all of a candidate’s or party’s expenses. To qualify for a reimbursement parties or 
candidates may have to meet certain limits such as receiving a specific percentage of the vote. 
Matching funds are contributions from private citizens or groups that the government matches so 
                                                          
18
 Electoral administration/procedural amounts are not included because all three countries employ the secret ballot 
and have governmental organizations overseeing the administration of the physical election and enforcing associated 
regulations, but they are not a part of the campaign expenditures for one party or another. 
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that each private contribution is worth more. Where matching funds are implemented, there is 
usually a limit to either how much campaigns can spend or to what point the government will 
match the funds. Additionally, US presidential matching funds also carry with them an 
expenditure limit for the campaign if accepted. Finally, there are allowances. Allowances are a 
set amount of money given to active parties and/or candidates for maintenance of their activities. 
What candidates and parties do in terms of fundraising and spending is affected by what kind of 
funding they receive from the government. 
Both Canada and the UK subsidize television advertising and airtime. Canadian subsidies 
center on television advertising, while subsidies in the UK take a broader approach. Television 
advertising subsidies in Canada take the form of discounted advertising rates before the last four 
weeks of the election season.  They divide 6.5 hours of “free” airtime on the major national 
stations between eligible parties in accordance with percentage of seats each party has in the 
House of Commons. While the UK also offers subsidized airtime for election advertising, they 
take a more holistic approach to subsidization. In addition to television advertising, the UK 
government offers free meeting space for campaign meetings and allows candidates to send one 
piece of campaign literature to every elector in their district for free. Canada and the UK offer 
these subsidies by including such things in the contracts of television stations who lease the 
airwaves. The US government also owns the air waves and leases them to various television 
stations. Although it does require broadcast stations to do public service broadcasting, part of 
which is offering candidates the lowest ad rate for a chosen time slot which independent groups 
cannot partake of, much more is spent on television advertising in the US than in either Canada 
or the UK. For example, in each country’s most recent election varying levels of funds were 
spent on advertising: in Canada $32.17 million (2011, $31.8 million: Elections Canada) by the 
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all parties, in the UK £2.97 million (2010, $4.3 million: UK Electoral Commission) by all 
candidates, and in the US $896.00 million (”Mad Money: TV ads in the 2012 presidential 
campaign”) by the presidential candidates alone. The difference being that political ads fill the 
airways in the United States in the months and weeks leading up to an election while they take 
up a comparatively modest amount of time in the other countries. One reason for this is that 
Canadian and UK parties, candidates, and outside organizations are limited in the amount they 
can spend in an election cycle which in turn limits the amount they can spend on such 
advertising. Another reason that amounts spent on advertising in either the UK or Canada might 
be so much lower are limits on the amount of allotted subsidized time, while the US has not put 
in place such regulations. In sum, the limited subsidies in the UK and Canada seem to influence 
the amount spent on advertising and decrease the necessity of campaigns spending their funds on 
advertising by restricting the amount that can be spent. In the US these restrictions do not exist, 
allowing for more to be spent on such ads.  
Like subsidies, the UK and Canada both utilize reimbursements, and like subsidies the 
US does not. Reimbursements defray the out of pocket expense and the need to raise funds for 
the election even though the money is not received until after the election is over. To receive a 
reimbursement in either country, the proper forms must be filled out if the candidate receives 
10% or more of the popular vote. In Canada up to 60% of funds can be reimbursed to candidates. 
If a similar rule was established in the US then the national government would have had to pay at 
most $1.88 billion in reimbursements in 2012, which is 60% of the official campaign 
expenditures for the Obama and Romney campaigns. 
The major public funds the US does offer are matching funds for presidential nomination 
elections, a provided allowance for the national party conventions, and full funding for 
P a g e  | 52 
 
presidential candidates in the general election if they choose to accept it. In the primary, 
matching funds are available. The national government matches up to $250 of each contribution 
to an eligible candidate (member of a major political party), and each candidate must raise at 
least $5000 in 20 states to receive the funds. Additionally, candidates must agree to a personal 
and campaign spending limit per state. In 2012, this limit was $45.6 million, but no major 
candidates accepted funds. In 2008, this limit was $42.05 million. For the general election, the 
nominee of each major party accepting public funds receives a grant of $20 million plus a cost-
of-living adjustment and cannot accept private donations for campaigning. In 2008, this was 
$84.1 million. In 2012, this was $91.2 million. Each major party may also receive $4 million 
plus cost-of-living adjustments for its nominating convention. However, in 2012 neither party 
nominee, neither Mitt Romney nor President Barack Obama, accepted public funds. This was the 
first election since its introduction in 1976 that neither nominee used public funds.  
When looking at the ratio or even existence of private and public funding for campaigns, 
it is important to understand who benefits from what type of funding. This could have important 
ramifications for what type of campaign finance regime is pushed for by individual politicians, 
groups and parties as a block. Ray La Raja emphasizes this in his book Small Change, where he 
highlights which factions within the parties and the parties themselves supported or opposed 
various campaign finance regulations. The reason for this is simple: public subsidies and strict 
expenditure limits favor some groups while reliance on private funding with few real limits aids 
a different set.  
Traditionally public subsidies favor groups who are already flush with other resources. 
For example, the Democrats in the US and Labour in the UK both contain constituencies that are 
more likely to contribute their time (labor) instead of money. As a result, neither party needs 
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money, which could be used to hire canvassers, people to phone bank, or any number of other 
labor intensive campaign tasks, to the same extent as their opponents to execute their respective 
ground games during an election. In the United States, the Republicans have combatted this 
Democratic advantage by trying to activate their own constituency networks. In many cases, they 
do seem to have closed the gap or at least made some headway in doing so. (Beck January 14, 
2013) 
On the other hand, a heavier emphasis on and looser regulations surrounding private 
financing of campaigns traditionally favors individuals and parties whose main constituency 
would rather donate than knock on doors or who have fewer members who are more willing to 
donate. For example, when campaign costs began to skyrocket in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
Republican party was able to keep up with the costs because they were better at raising the 
increasing sums of money necessary to run a campaign. The Democrats in observing the 
Republican advantage sought to diminish their lead by changing their own fundraising strategies 
and introducing the 1972 FECA which introduced campaign expenditure limits. The Supreme 
Court later struck these limits down. Since then, the Democrats have been able to close the gap, 
at least in part (La Raja 2008).  
Loose regulation of private campaign financing not only advantages one party over 
another, but also advantages the rich over the not so rich. Today in the US this is seen in 
Congressional policy production. In Larry Bartels’ 2008 book Unequal Democracy: The 
Political Economy of the New Gilded Age, he shows that elected officials are more respondent to 
affluent constituents, who he classifies as those occupying either the top third or fifth income 
bracket, than poorer constituents. More recently, Bartels along with Benjamin Page and Jason 
Seawright wrote a paper discussing the bias in policy preferences in the top 1%--more 
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conservative than the average American—may account for the more conservative than average 
policies Congress has recently produced (2012). As highlighted by this research, the effects of a 
campaign finance regime may give rise to troubling concerns about the health of a country’s 
democracy.  
Summary 
When examined holistically, all three influences work together within the existent 
framework to set identifiable boundaries for the campaign finance regime. The existence and 
extent of use of public funds for campaigns affect the amount needed to buy other campaign 
resources such as advertising time and meeting halls. Additionally, if the government provides 
concrete resources instead of money for campaigns, then the likelihood of restrictions placed on 
the procurement of those resources by candidates, parties, and outside organizations seemingly 
increases. While the introduction of public funds lowers the amount of money necessary to be 
spent in an election, it is not the only factor that sets limits. The size of electoral districts, 
measured by both population and physical size, and length of the official and unofficial 
campaign seasons influences the amount spent in elections and the limits set on either donations 
or expenditures. The structure of a campaign finance regime seems to rely on the structural 
framework and on boundary setting within that framework. 
Implications of the Finance Regime 
While the impact of the regime framework and limits have been discussed solely in the 
context of the formation of the campaign finance regimes, they also may have implications for 
the function of a country’s democracy; specifically in the generation of corruption. In the minds 
of many, money and wealth are seen as facilitators of corruption. This perception, and the impact 
of the popularization of this perception, can be seen in the justifications used by both US and 
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Canadian lawmakers when used in writing new regulations and in the courts when regulations 
are allowed to stand. Such people claim that they are aiming to limit existent or perceived 
corruption either in the electoral system or democracy as a whole. Corruption can occur at the 
individual or systemic level. At the systemic level, corruption can either mean mass corruption of 
individual politicians or a corruption of the democratic process.  
Many, today and in previous decades, point towards the rising costs of an election as 
evidence of corruption, but rising costs in and of itself do not necessarily indicate corruption. 
They could simply indicate a rising cost of campaign materials such as air time or inflation. 
Additionally, some social scientists claim there is no need to worry about corruption at the macro 
scale until increases in expenditures from one cycle to the next outpace the growth of the 
economy (Ansolabehere 2007). In the United States, this has happened in recent years. In 2008, 
more money was spent than ever before on campaigns despite a contracting GDP. Regardless of 
what rising costs actually mean, they seem to inspire the perception of rising corruption in either 
or both the government or/and elections. As a result, perceptions of corruption in the populace 
have spurred legislators into trying to limit the increasing costs of elections.   
Examples of this include the United States’ Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) of 
1971 and 1974. Legislators aimed at curtailing the skyrocketing costs of elections. At the time 
two reasons were cited for this: First, Democrats claimed to want to promote fairness in elections 
by ensuring that it would not require big money to be involved.  Second, there were growing 
worries that the huge jump in expenditures may lead or may have already led to corruption of the 
system and officials. The first reason would be declared an unfit reason to curtail a citizen’s right 
of freedom of speech. Additionally, voiced as such the first reason was most likely a barely 
hidden political maneuver by the Democrats to limit the monetary advantage of the Republicans. 
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The second reason, however, was recognized by the US Supreme Court as a just reason to place 
limitations on the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech where money spent in 
an election is an exercise of that right. At this time the perception of mass corruption was enough 
for politicians to pass the first FECA in 1971. The first major set of amendments took place after 
a demonstration of corruption at the federal level during the 1972 Nixon re-election campaign 
(La Raja 2008; Boatright 2011).  
While the US wrote, debated, and then passed the FECA, Canadian officials, media, and 
individuals observed the difficulties that perceived and real corruption caused in the US and 
decided to take preemptive action against it. In 1974, Canada passed the Election Expenses Act. 
Almost thirty years later this occurred again when the Canada Election Act passed during heated 
debates over the influence of soft money in the US. Perceived corruption in a nearby democracy 
seemed to have spurred Canada to push through legislation designed to slow down increases in 
expenditures (Boatright 2011). Today rising expenditures in Canadian elections appears to have 
slowed—especially when compared to the US.  
In the United States expenditures continue to increase faster than in the UK or Canada. 
This increase has induced perceptions of corruption once again, often fueled internationally 
rather than domestically. In the UK, minor election reforms have taken place every couple of 
years in the past decade to attempt to rectify the concern of distance and perceptions of 
corruption citizens have had. This has been highlighted by their reactions to a 2006 report on 
perceptions of campaign finance in the system. While the UK appears to be rectifying 
perceptions of corruption, the US seems to be ignoring them.  
Internationally, newspaper after newspaper writes about how much money the US spends 
in elections. Canadian politicians point to the US as an example of how corrupt a system can 
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become. Still more questions are raised about why so much needs to be raised and spent. 
Implicitly the international community seems to be asking their readers whether or not the US 
system and politicians are corrupt. However, domestically there is little demand for reform. This 
raises an interesting problem for US politicians: do international perceptions of our electoral 
system matter? Depending on the answer to this question, the US may need to reevaluate its 
existent body of laws and regulations governing the campaign finance regime. The existent link 
between perceptions of corruption within the system, citizen trust of politicians, and campaign 
finance show that the campaign finance regime impacts far broader than simply election 
campaigns and outcomes in the system.  
Regardless of whether international bafflement at the cost of US elections is legal 
justification to challenge previous court rulings, international skepticism should indicate that the 
US should reevaluate its current system. Questions should be raise. Does equating political 
spending to free speech preserve the principle of one person one vote, or violate it? Are 
corporations partaking in rent seeking behaviors through campaign contributions? Are the 
politicians corrupt? Is encouraging a campaign arms race responsible in a democracy? If the 
current system is perverting, how can it be fixed? 
Some research has already been done on these questions. Larry Bartels and others have 
begun researching the effect big donors and affluent constituents versus poor constituents have 
on policy. They have found that those with money have a greater say in what laws are passed and 
what policies are enacted (Bartels 2008; Benjamin, Bartels, and Seawright 2013), thus 
suggesting those with money may have “more than one vote”. However, this is only a beginning. 
More needs to be done to appropriately evaluate the current situation.   
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Conclusion 
 Campaign finance regimes in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada appear 
to be influenced by the existent political structures in each of the country. The two main ways 
this is done is by structuring the regulatory framework and influencing which limits on money in 
campaigns are set and how they are set. First, the regulatory framework was explored. Here it 
was shown that the structure of the various campaign finance regimes is determined by the 
number and relative importance of the offices and focal point of the campaign, whether it is 
candidates or parties. Second, limit setting was analyzed. Limits, while in part restrained by the 
country’s constitution and how the courts interpret it, are influenced by the length of the election 
season, size of electoral districts, and reliance on or lack of public subsidies. Finally, potential 
implications of the regimes were discussed. The important point here is that perceptions of 
corruption stemming from perceptions of the state of campaign finance can diminish the trust of 
individuals in their institutions and in turn diminish the credibility of those institutions. This may 
also occur if politicians are perceived as spending more time raising money than being 
responsive to those who donate or their constituents. 
While limiting the scope to a subset of Anglo-Saxon allowed the focus to be placed 
solely on the variation in campaign finance regimes, it does limit the scope and generalizability 
of this study, which could be broadened by examining more and different countries. In a future 
study, a greater number of countries and more variable countries should be included to identify 
what influences remain constant regardless of the structure of a given democracy. Additionally, 
future studies can build off the foundation this study provides by delving further into how and 
why regulations are passed and delineate whether changes to the regulatory system simply codify 
informal changes in the system or whether they actually change the regime. Despite its 
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limitations, this study does provide a unique perspective in the campaign finance literature and a 
stepping stone to further studies on the formation of campaign finance regimes.  
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